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Middle East

What is “All Eyes on Rafah”?: A Social Media Slogan Turned Social Advocacy Movement

Following an Israeli ground offensive operation in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip, an AI-generated image containing the slogan “All Eyes on Rafah” gained attention after over 40 million shares of the image on Instagram and over 195,000 posts with the hashtag #AllEyesOnRafah on TikTok, according to Forbes. Included in this discussion have been several popular public figures such as “Bridgerton” star Nicola Coughlan, model Bella Hadid, singer-songwriter Kehlani, and one of India’s top actors, Varun Dhawan.

Origin

The phrase comes from a comment made by the Director of the World Health Organization’s Office of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Rick Peeperkorn, who stated “All eyes are on Rafah” in February after Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an evacuation of the city in order to enact a planned attack to eliminate the “last remaining strongholds of the militant group Hamas”.

Background

On May 24, 2024, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to halt its military operations in Rafah. On May 26, 2024, the Israeli military sent missiles into what they believed was a Hamas installation in Rafah that ended up killing 45 Palestinians and 2 senior Hamas militants. The strike sparked a fire that spread into a nearby neighborhood called Tal al-Sultan where many Palestinians were seeking shelter, burning down several houses and those residing within. A comment by Prime Minister Netanyahu states that the attack was “a tragic mistake” (Al Jazeera Staff). Just two days after this attack, the New York Times reported that an air strike conducted by the Israeli military killed 21 people in the city’s “safe zone” called al-Mawasi.

Purpose

The slogan calls attention to the situation in Rafah, a city in the Gaza Strip near the border with Egypt, where Israeli military operations have resulted in the deaths of several Palestinians seeking shelter and safety in the city. The slogan has been spread widely through social media and can now be seen on protest posters and social media graphics.

Future

In the coming days, action on the part of the Israeli military is unpredictable with the United States President stating “if they go into Rafah, I’m not supplying the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah, to deal with the cities, to deal with that problem”. US-Israel relations are now up in the air with many White House officials claiming that Israel did not cross President Biden’s outlined red line. Spokesperson John Kirby supports this claim by telling BBC that there were “no policy changes to speak to” when answering a question about whether the strike on Rafah crossed President Biden’s limits to supporting Israel. However, Mr. Kirby went on to say, “We don’t support, we won’t support a major ground operation in Rafah”. The question is whether the recent attacks in the city constitute “a major ground operation”.

Written by Special Projects Intern, Amanda Nguyen

Citations

Al-Shalchi, Hadeel, and Anas Baba. “An Israeli Airstrike Killed 45 Palestinians in an Encampment for Displaced People.” NPR, NPR, 27 May 2024, www.npr.org/2024/05/27/nx-s1-4982690/rafah-encampment-israeli-airstrike-hamas

Cooney, Christy. “Israel Gaza: Operation in Rafah Doesn’t Cross US Red Lines – White House.” BBC News, BBC, 28 May 2024, www.bbc.com/news/articles/cv22pl9p212o

Roeloffs, Mary Whitfill. “All Eyes on Rafah” Slogan Spreads on Social Media: What to Know about Its Origins.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 29 May 2024, www.forbes.com/sites/maryroeloffs/2024/05/28/all-eyes-on-rafah-slogan-spreads-on-social-media-what-to-know-about-its-origins/?sh=627a54582217

Shamim, Sarah. “What Is ‘All Eyes on Rafah’? Decoding a Viral Social Trend on Israel’s War.” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 29 May 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/29/what-is-all-eyes-on-rafah-decoding-the-latest-viral-social-trend#:~:text=“All%20eyes%20on%20Rafah”%20is%20an%20artificial%20intelligence%20

Staff, Al Jazeera. “What Happened When Israel Attacked Rafah?” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 28 May 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/28/what-happened-when-israel-attacked-rafah

Yazbek, Hiba, and Abu Bakr Bashir. “Gazan Officials Say a Strike Killed 21 in Al-Mawasi.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 28 May 2024, www.nytimes.com/2024/05/28/world/middleeast/gaza-al-mawasi-strike.html

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Interruption of Ramadan Might Bring Chaos into the World Order

Ramadan has come to an end. However, peace in the Middle East is yet to be established. During this year’s Ramadan, which started from March 10 to April 9, the holy month in Syria was violently interrupted by an airstrike operation. The embassy of Iran in Syria was destroyed to the ground with the efforts of anonymous international powers. At least, any possibly involved parties never officially confirmed the attack. On April 1st, it was still unknown; however, now that more information is available from diverse sources, it is more likely that the suspicions are confirmed.

In a recent New York Times article on the Iranian embassy bombing and tension in the Middle East rising, four Israeli military officials, who chose to stay anonymous, identified Israeli’s direct involvement in the seven deaths of Iranian military advisors during the strike, including senior officers. This appearance has led to an increase in tensions in the region. The Iranian media, after the New York Times release, stated that the most possible goal of the attack was the death of Zahedi, who is a senior commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He is known for being the one building and strengthening the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim political party and militant group based in Lebanon.

A comprehensive background of the region is necessary to understand the full picture. This was not the first time Syria’s sovereignty was violated. After the October 7 attack last year, Syria was struck by Israel in response, often interpreted by Israeli leaders as a “punishment” for their cooperation with Israel’s “enemies”, which includes Iran and Hezbollah. These attacks included two airport strikes, particularly on Damascus and Aleppo, and an assassination of a general, Razi Mousavi, in the Syrian capital. These events led to many casualties and the deaths of innocent civilians.

This combination of incidents led to Iranian officials issuing a statement that this violence and violation of the security of Iran and all their allies “needs to be punished.” 

After the attack, Iranian commander Yahya Rahim Safavi said that Israeli embassies were no longer safe, which is a direct threat to Israel by Iran. This leads to a direct rise in tension between the two countries and a high risk of conflict escalation in the Middle East region.

As their response to the embassy being burned down by the enemies, Iran did not stop there. Iran’s foreign minister on April 8th accused the United States of giving Israel the “green light” for a strike on their embassy in Syria, as neither of the states tried to stop the attack. This open statement, which was not too unknown to Iranian officials, increased the tension in the region and worldwide. However, denying US influence in this military operation is also impossible. 

Hezbollah, who is seen as the most powerful ally of Iran, also chose not to stay aside and openly stated in the media that “this crime will not pass without the enemy receiving punishment and revenge.”

At the same time, Israel does not seem to question the methods being used in the process of deterrence applied to their immediate neighbors, “the Israelis are convinced that if they seek to hang back, the threat will grow and not diminish,” referred Jon Alterman to the methods.

The Iranian embassy bombing in Syria did not symbolize a new beginning, nor was it out of the blue. The constantly rising tension was once again fueled in the Middle East. 

Now, the world is once again left to wonder what will happen next.

Written by: Sofiia Lobas, Event Intern

Notes:

Image taken by Marek Studzinski

Iran aims to contain fallout in Israel response, will not be hasty, sources say | Reuters. (n.d.-a). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-aims-contain-fallout-israel-response-wont-be-hasty-sources-say-2024-04-11/

Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders | Reuters. (n.d.-b). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/

Maloney, S. (2024, April 18). Iran’s Order of Chaos. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-order-chaos-suzanne-maloney

Wikimedia Foundation. (2024, April). Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Israeli_bombing_of_the_Iranian_embassy_in_Damascus#:~:text=The%20New%20York%20Times%20reported,discussing%20the%20war%20in%20Gaza.

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Unraveling Alliances: Texas A&M’s Decision and the Future of Qatar’s Educational Diplomacy

Texas A&M ended its 21-year long-term education alliance with Qatar with immediate plans to end operations in Qatar by 2028. This unexpected turn is affecting Qatar’s public education diplomacy as the system board of regents of Texas A&M voted 7-1 in favor of ending its contract.

The university cited various factors that contributed to the withdrawal, including the heightened instability in the Middle East, the core mission of advancing Texas A&M solely in the United States, and the disinformation campaign regarding the Qatar campus potentially having a connection to nuclear reactor research done in Texas or the Los Alamos National Lab. 

The withdrawal of Texas A&M University had a negative impact on Qatar’s Education City, established in 1997. As of February 2024, Qatar hosts prestigious American universities, including Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medicine, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, and Northwestern University. These distinguished American Universities have allowed Qatar to successfully carry out education diplomacy campaigns to diversify its economy, attract global talent, address the nation’s developing needs, and promote cultural exchange. 

Texas A&M’s withdrawal paves a way for similar actions by other American universities, creating a domino effect that can ultimately alter the need for Qatar’s Education City and educational diplomacy efforts. 

Professors and students currently teaching or attending Texas A&M Qatar’s campus voiced their opinions and concerns across social media platforms. Khalid Al-Sada, the student government president and a senior majoring in chemical engineering at the Qatar campus, spoke to various media outlets, including the Texas Tribune, stating, “we were all just left wondering what is going to happen to the dreams, the hopes we had, our hopes, what we wanted to achieve with all the different studying and all of that.” 

Texas A&M’s exit could leave Qatar with a negative reputation in education and business. The potential negative reputation will have financial implications in Education City that will affect operational funding, causing Qatar to seek alternative funding sources or adjust its financial structure. Texas A&M’s decision would lead to a decrease in enrollment and the potential discontinuation of research and innovation programs that once filled an educational gap. 

Furthermore, this will prompt Qatar to reconsider its strategy for attracting and maintaining international educational partnerships. The new educational approaches would involve exploring fresh partnerships. However, the withdrawal of American universities can leave a gap, allowing Qatar’s Gulf neighbors and competitors, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Saudi Arabia, to influence higher education significantly. The U.A.E. has already established a New York University (N.Y.U.) Abu Dhabi campus and continues to establish American medical school campuses such as Baylor College of Medicine in Dubai. 

The future of Qatar’s education city and education diplomacy efforts are still being determined, with a trail of pressing questions. If Qatar’s Education City begins to fail due to the withdrawal of universities, will Qatar pivot and focus on its ambitious climate change and sustainability goals? How will Qatar persuade its international peers that it is a stable and safe region to do business after the disinformation campaign? Either way, with the anticipation of Qatar’s responses, the Texas A&M board will continue to implement its plan to withdraw from Qatar by 2028, thus leading to an unraveling of alliances between Qatar and Texas A&M that could negatively impact the diplomatic relationship between Qatar and the United States. 

Samia Rodriguez is a master’s candidate in Northeastern University’s Global Studies and International Relations program. 

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Tackling Terror in the Sahel: Steps to Counter Resurgent Islamist Militancy in the Lake Chad Basin Region

A spate of mass kidnappings this past week shook Nigeria, underscoring the persistent threat of Islamist militant groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region and the need for renewed and coordinated responses to counter them. On March 7, armed men wearing military uniforms on motorbikes abducted over 280 children between the ages of seven and 18 from a school in Kuriga, Kaduna State.[1] Then, two days later, bandits abducted 15 children and one woman while they were asleep from Gidan Bakuso, a village in Nigeria’s northwest Sokoto State.[2] Although no group has claimed responsibility for the abductions, local and state officials, as well as regional analysts, suspect that Boko Haram and Ansaru, an offshoot of the former that broke away in January 2012, are to blame.[3] The attacks were preceded by the purported abduction of nearly 200 persons in Ngala, Borno State on March 1, although regional security analyst David Otto, director of the Geneva Center for Africa Security and Strategic Studies, has asserted that the disappearance of these persons is in fact more likely a case of recidivism, as internally displaced persons (IDPs) flee squalid living conditions in government-run IDP camps.[4] These recent events are alarming not only because they demonstrate that regional efforts to combat Boko Haram and Ansaru are failing, but because they also suggest that government efforts to manage the situation are worsening the plight of many Nigerians and driving them into the arms of the insurgency. As such, now is the time to conduct a new appraisal of the instability plaguing the LCB region and to offer fresh insights into how best to counter Islamist militant groups operating in the area.


Rectifying Grievances


Nigerian state officials must undertake scrupulous and dedicated reforms to reduce the appeal of Boko Haram and other Islamist militant groups. This means that Nigerian officials must engage in the sustainable development of impoverished regions by improving infrastructure – particularly roadways, water, and sewage – as well as providing more far-reaching access to healthcare and education. Such development is especially needed in areas that Nigerian military forces have recaptured from militants. Officials must also find a way to better manage persons migrating to Nigerian agricultural lands and cities as a result of climate change. Desertification in Chad has driven Chadians into Nigerian agricultural land, creating “sons of the soil” conflicts in which local inhabitants feud with migrants over access to limited water supplies and housing.[5] Such desertification has also driven Fulani pastoralists of northern Nigeria into southern cities, risking a spike in ethnic tensions that have already led to the targeted killings of Fulani in nearby Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ghana.

[6] These migrants are especially susceptible to being radicalized by Islamist militant groups because of their unstable economic situation. Nigerian officials should also engage in systematic institutional reform to counter rampant corruption and nepotism. Officials must look to improve the Nigerian public’s trust in the government by enhancing transparency and accountability. Creating initiatives that help educated Nigerians find suitable employment is imperative to help stem disillusionment. Additionally, providing training in trades and other technical skill sets will help to alleviate the strain on Nigeria’s economy and augment the workforce with workers whose skills can be used to repair and construct much-needed infrastructure. A further point of consideration lies in improving the conditions of IDP camps. Life in IDP camps is often a little easier than living in areas controlled by militants, and many camp inhabitants suffer from malnutrition.[7]

Consequently, Nigerian officials must take steps to ensure that camp inhabitants have access to adequate food, potable water, and shelter. An additional concern is providing camp inhabitants with access to healthcare, including psychosocial counseling for those who have suffered from sexual violence and other traumatic experiences. Officials must also work to provide job training and education for inhabitants to provide them with a sense of direction and purpose, lest the lack thereof prove an enticement to return to areas controlled by militants.
Finally, Nigerian officials must establish offramps for militants seeking to rejoin society. Many members of Boko Haram and Ansaru are forcibly conscripted when captured by militants during raids. As a result, forced conscripts become trapped in militant groups out of fear that surrendering will result in their execution, a valid concern in light of the regional military force’s frequent human rights violations. The Nigerian National Security Agency has created deradicalization and reeducation programs, but these programs require greater funding and must be more readily publicized to be effective at winning over potential militant
defectors.[8]


Military Reform


In addition to enacting transformative institutional, economic, and social policies, Nigerian officials must also reform the national military and work to convert the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) into a competent counterinsurgency organization. The Nigerian military’s history of human rights violations has eroded Nigerians’ trust in it, and as such, the Nigerian government must work to ensure stricter troop discipline and greater accountability.[9] Enhancing civilian-military relations is a part of this process, and moving the MNJTF’s human rights office out of the military chain of command and transferring it to a civilian authority will likely help to restore trust while improving accountability for crimes committed by military personnel.[10] Regional government and military officials can also work to bolster the MNJTF by resolving certain funding deadlocks. Doing so would enable the MNJTF to provide its troops with more adequate equipment and training, thus raising morale and effectiveness while decreasing the likelihood of defection or human rights abuses. MNJTF headquarters needs to also improve trust among the force’s various Cameroonian, Chadian, Nigerian, and Nigerien national contingents, something that can be accomplished through joint training exercises, further language training, and officer development programs. The MNJTF must also seek to establish a common counterinsurgency doctrine among all national contingents, seeing as each national contingent’s individual school of practice hampers collective force integration and coordination.[11] By aligning national counterinsurgency practice with a coherent organization-wide doctrinal framework, time can be spent preparing MNJTF forces for offensive campaigns rather than teaching preliminary force integration techniques. As a final point of consideration, the MNJTF national contingents should partake in greater intelligence sharing to facilitate joint planning and operations. This will first require building greater trust between governments, but doing so will strengthen interstate relations and improve the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns.

Looking Ahead: The Risk of Inaction


The recent mass abductions in Nigeria attest to the enduring threat that Boko Haram, Ansaru, and other Islamist militant groups pose to the national and regional security of the LCB region. Previous efforts to counteract these groups have been hamstrung by persistent grievances such as corruption and limited economic opportunities, as well as an ineffective counterinsurgency force. Engaging in reforms to reduce the appeal of joining these militant groups will help deprive militants of recruits. In order to ensure security and diminish the risk of further abductions and attacks, however, national and regional military systems need to be better funded to sufficiently equip their forces. They also need to create mechanisms that improve accountability, bolster civil-military relations, and establish a common doctrine in order to become a competent fighting
force. Delaying much-needed reforms not only exacerbates current problems but elevates the risk that Islamist militant groups will come to possess the resources and networks that enable them to conduct more sophisticated and coordinated attacks in concert with one another. While the problems driving regional insecurity will take years to fully address, the aforementioned recommendations are a starting point for waging a comeback against Islamist militant groups wreaking havoc throughout the region.

[1]Angelique Chrisafis, “Search Continues for Hundreds of Kidnapped Nigerian Schoolchildren,”
The Guardian, March 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/search-
continues-kidnapped-nigerian-schoolchildre n.

[2] Taiwo Adebayo, “A Decade Since the Chibok Abduction, More Than 1,400 Nigerian Students
Have Been Kidnapped,” Associated Press News, March 9, 2024,
https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-abduction-gunmen-e7d9ba127485e893d80eae1218b702fd.
[3] Mansur Abubakar, “Kuriga Kidnap: More Than 280 Nigerian Pupils Abducted,” BBC, March
9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68504329.
[4] Sarah Carter, “Mass Kidnappings from Nigeria Schools Show ‘The State Does Not Have
Control,’ One Expert Says,” CBS News, March 11, 2024,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nigeria-kidnapping-schools-state-does-not-have-control-expert/.
[5] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, “Population, Climate, and Conflict: New Data Point to Greater
Challenges Ahead,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 29, 2021,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/population-climate-and-conflict-new-data-point-greater-challenges-
ahea d.
[6] James Courtright, “Ethnic Killings by West African Armies Are Undermining Regional
Security,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/07/mali-burkina-faso-
fulani-ethnic-killings-by-west-african-armies -are-undermining-regional-security/.
[7] Brit McCandless Farmer, “Beyond the Chibok Girls: Inside Nigeria’s IDP Camps,” CBS News,
February 17, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beyond-the-chibok-girls-inside-nigerias-idp-
camps-60-minutes/.
[8] Jennifer G. Cooke, “Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, ‘Boko Haram: The Islamist Insurgency in West
Africa,’” Center for Security and International Studies, February 24, 2016, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/ts160224_Coo ke.pdf.
[9] Olabanji Akinola, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism,

Politics, and Poverty,” African Security 8, no. 1 (2015): 18,
https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.998539.
[10] International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting
Boko Haram?” Africa Report No. 291, July 7, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-
africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-b oko-haram.
[11] Gershon Adela, “Institutional Counterinsurgency Frameworks in the Lake Chad Basin: The
Case of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram,” Defense & Security Analysis
39, no. 1 (2023): 102-103, doi:10.1080/14751798.2023.2166520.

Photo courtesy of utenriksdept on Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Mason W. Krusch is a master’s candidate in the Global Studies and International Relations
program at Northeastern University (Boston, MA). His research interests include Eurasian
security, unconventional warfare, information warfare, and strategic communication. He holds a
BA in history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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The Shia Minority and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Threat

The Breakdown

Islam, one of the world’s major religions, has numerous sects among its following with Shia being one that is prominent in the Middle East. While states such as Iraq and Iran have a majority of Shia followers that mostly live in a peaceful coexistence among other Islam sects, Pakistan offers a noticeably different experience for the Shia. In Pakistan, the Shia are the minority. They are consistently met with violent threats, persecution, and discrimination, especially by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi group. By exploring the historical context, distinct discriminatory incidents against Shia in Pakistan, and prior efforts to find a peace, solutions surface that are well within the capability of the government of Pakistan and local communities to ensure peace and protection for this minority group.

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Widespread Shia Persecution

Shia Muslims in Pakistan represent only a small fraction, specifically 10-20%, of the entire population. Sunni Muslims, who significantly outnumber the Shia have maintained historically rooted antagonistic sentiments. This stems from centuries-old disputes around religious interpretations of sacred Islam texts. At the same time, parts of the Middle East, from the late of the 20th century to today, became a breeding ground for violence justified by religion. The region alone is responsible for 36% of worldwide terrorism, a statistic that alludes to the pressing need for more concentrated peace and reconciliation efforts.

The U.N., recognizing this escalating threat, rolled out the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. Although well-intended, its primary focus was on the major terror outfits. As a result, smaller yet potent groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were often sidelined in global counter-terrorism initiatives. This organization’s modus operandi is unique in that it doesn’t aim for significant political changes, it rather specializes almost exclusively in terrorizing Shia communities. Their atrocities since the onset of the 21st century are grim, causing around 700 Shia deaths, a number that is tragically high for any civil society.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the controversy surrounding Osama Bin Laden’s concealment and subsequent death became a focal point for the world’s attention as it related to Pakistan. Questions arose, hinting at Pakistan possibly providing safe haven to the world’s most-wanted terrorist. Such allegations have added to concerns about Pakistan’s genuine commitment to combating terrorism. With the Prime Minister’s 2020 statement, where Bin Laden was referred to as a “martyr”, the water became murkier. Such developments rose genuine apprehensions that extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi might be operating with impunity in Pakistan, subsequently threatening regional stability.

The Shia, an already vulnerable community in Pakistan, face heightened persecution, compounded by stringent blasphemy laws. An incident involving Syed Kareem, who voiced his sentiments online, served as a case in point. His comments against the killing of a historic Shia figure led to him being branded an extremist, resulting in blasphemy charges. This already volatile situation was exacerbated in September 2022 when widespread Sunni protests erupted with demands that were not only discriminatory, but also alarmingly violent.

Pakistan’s Shifting Political Landscape & Strategic Policy Recommendation 

Pakistan’s political trajectory, especially in recent years, appears to lean increasingly towards extremism. The events of 2017 and 2018, where hardline groups secured political influence, is a testament to this worrying shift. Their growing clout in the parliamentary corridors of power has many international observers concerned, particularly considering their alleged ties to terrorism.

To provide lasting solutions to the issues at hand, a dual approach is required: a strong domestic policy framework augmented by international support. Pakistan, with its intricate socio-political landscape, must design robust mechanisms to screen and disqualify potential office-bearers with extremist leanings or terror affiliations. A stringent governmental background check mechanism should be the cornerstone of this policy, ensuring that individuals with extremist associations are meticulously filtered out.

Emerging from anti-Shia sentiments of the 1990s, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s rapid evolution into a dominant extremist force in Pakistan deserves intense scrutiny. Their doctrine, rooted in a rigid Sunni interpretation, sees Shias as apostates. This not only endangers this already threatened minority but also poses significant challenges to Pakistan’s secular fabric. Their operational prowess is further bolstered by their connections with major terror networks, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Effectively countering their influence demands a multi-faceted approach: a combination of military action, intelligence maneuvers, socio-economic development strategies, and proactive interfaith dialogues. For Pakistan’s national growth, stability, and enhanced international image, neutralizing such threats is non-negotiable.

With deep-seated historical prejudices intensifying, and the nation’s political trajectory seemingly favoring extremist ideologies, comprehensive policies are an urgent need to ensure the Shia community’s safety and the overarching stability of Pakistan.

Written by: Justin R. Boulanger, a MS candidate in the Global Studies and International Relations program at Northeastern University.

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Israel-Palestine Conflict Webinar

On Monday, October 16, 2023, the World Affairs Council of Orange County hosted a Zoom webinar on the Israel-Palestine conflict and the October 2023 developments.

Dr. Ahlam Muhtaseb, Professor of Media Studies at CSU San Bernardino & Dr. Daniel Segal, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology and History at Pitzer College of the Claremont Colleges, spoke about the atrocities committed in Israel and Gaza, provided historical context to the long-standing conflict, and addressed the issue of misinformation in certain media outlets.

Thank you to our speakers for agreeing to share their knowledge on such short notice–we are grateful to you both. Thank you to our attendees who tuned in for this webinar and participating with your questions.

We hope to see you all at an upcoming World Affairs Council of Orange County event!

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